Is Hume Attempting to Introduce a New, Pragmatic Conception of a Contradiction in his Treatise?

Alan Kenneth Schwerin

doi:10.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p315

Autores/as

Alan Kenneth Schwerin Associate Professor of Philosophy Monmouth University New Jersey USA

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p315

Resumen

Hume’s Treatise, with its celebrated bundle theory of the self, is a significant contribution to the embryonic Newtonian experimental philosophy of the enlightenment. But the theory is inadequate as it stands, as the appendix to the Treatise makes clear. For this account of the self, apparently, rests on contradictory principles — propositions, fortunately, that can be reconciled, according to Hume. My paper is a critical exploration of Hume’s argument for this intriguing suggestion.

Biografía del autor/a

Alan Kenneth Schwerin, Associate Professor of Philosophy Monmouth University New Jersey USA

Associate Professor of Philosophy, past President of the Bertrand Russell Society and author of 36 international articles in Philosophy. I am the author or editor of nine books, including my last book on Hume, Hume's Labyrinth: A search for the self.