Truth as a Mathematical Object

Authors

  • Jean-Yves Béziau Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p31

Abstract

In this paper we discuss in which sense truth is considered as a mathematical object in propositional logic. After clarifying how this concept is used in classical logic, through the notions of truth-table, truth-function and bivaluation, we examine some generalizations of it in non-classical logics: many-valued matrix semantics with three and four values, non-truth-functional bivalent semantics, Kripke possible world semantics.

Author Biography

Jean-Yves Béziau, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

Departmento de Filosofia

Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

Published

2010-01-05

Issue

Section

Articles