On rawlsian algorithms for autonomous cars

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2026.e109620

Keywords:

artificial intelligence, maximin, justice, autonomous vehicles

Abstract

This study reconstructs some of the central aspects of Derek Leben’s proposal to apply John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness to the development of ethical algorithms for AI-guided vehicles, as well as Keeling’s criticisms that the proposal contains inaccuracies in its interpretation of Rawls’s thought. It further highlights additional points where Leben’s interpretation appears mistaken. Although this paper does not oppose the underlying idea itself—namely, that the application of Rawlsian algorithms to autonomous vehicles is an intellectually promising enterprise with concrete practical implications—it aims to clarify and refine the philosophical foundations of such an approach.

References

AGAR, Nicholas. The sceptical optimist: why technology isn't the answer to everything. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK, 2015.

BUCHANAN, Allan. Our moral fate: evolution and the escape from tribalism. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2020.

KEELING, G. Against leben’s rawlsian collision algorithm for autonomous vehicles. In: MÜLLER, V. (eds). Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence: studies in applied philosophy, epistemology and rational ethics, v. 44. Springer, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96448-5_29.

LEBEN, D. A Rawlsian algorithm for autonomous vehicles. Ethics Inf Technol v.19, p. 107–115, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-017-9419-3.

LEBEN, Derek. Ethics for robots: how to design a moral algorithm. New York: Routledge, 2018.

PERSSON, Ingmar; SAVULESCU, Julian. Unfit for the future: the need for moral enhancement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

RAWLS, John. The law of peoples. Critical Inquiry, v. 20, n. 1, p. 36-68, 1993.

RAWLS, John. A theory of justice. Revised Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999 [1971].

Downloads

Published

2026-04-29

Issue

Section

Dossiê Ética e Justiça