Kant e il dibattito sulle questioni di fine vita

Abstract

In this article I claim that in a Kantian perspective the rational capacity of human beings can be considered as the core of moral life and, more generally, of human experience. On this basis I try to answer the following question: how should we conceive the value of life when the specifically human features are missing? More precisely, I suggest an antinaturalistic interpretation of Kantian theory concerning duties to oneself: my aim is to show that the ends of nature cannot work as a criterion for judging the correct use of our own dispositions. This reading can be applied to Kant’s reflections on suicide, stressing that the Kantian view is a quite complex one and requires therefore careful consideration. Indeed, Kant does not conceive life a merely biological concept; this is the reason why I would like to point out that the Kantian perspective on these topics can provide an interesting conceptual background for the contemporary debate on end-of-life questions.