La Representación del Conocimiento desde la Neurofilosofía: Perspectivas Simbólica, Conexionista, Enactivista y Motora

David Casacuberta; Anna Estany

doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2026.e108183

Authors

David Casacuberta Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7119-9342
Anna Estany Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4900-9810

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2026.e108183

Keywords:

Representationalism, Connectionism, Enactivism, Motor Cognition, Material Anchor

Abstract

The philosophy of science has always focused on the representation of knowledge, which manifests itself in different ways, such as the analysis of concepts, laws, theories, and explanatory models. Despite this, there is no unanimous agreement on which of these categories is the fundamental unit of representation. This study will explore various approaches, including the symbolic paradigm, connectionism, enactivism, and motor representation. Our purpose is to analyze these perspectives on knowledge representation, link them with key theses in the philosophy of science, and finally, propose a neurocognitively founded conceptualization of knowledge representation, integrating the various examined views. For this monograph, Patricia S. Churchland's Neurophilosophy will serve as a reference work for the analysis of cognitive science approaches to knowledge representation.

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