La naturalidad del escepticismo

Authors

  • Jesus Antonio Coll Mármol JESÚS ANTONIO COLL MÁRMOL Grupo de Investigación Phronesis Universidad de Murcia jesus.coll@um.es

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p277

Abstract

In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices. I admit that this strategy is really promising, especially when applied to Cartesian scepticism. However, when it faces an older ancestor of Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism, this situation changes. I concentrate on Fogelin’s neopyrrhonist proposal and how Williams’ strategy would face it. I will defend that Pyrrhonian scepticism is a completely natural kind of scepticism according to our epistemic practices. I will also maintain that this kind of skepticism is the unavoidable result of reflecting about those epistemic practices.

Author Biography

Jesus Antonio Coll Mármol, JESÚS ANTONIO COLL MÁRMOL Grupo de Investigación Phronesis Universidad de Murcia jesus.coll@um.es

Jesús A. Coll Mármol is M.A. in Philosophy of Mind by the University of Hull (U.K.) and PhD by the University of Murcia (Spain). He has taught at the University of Valencia and the University of Murcia. He has published articles in journals as Análisis Filosófico, Crítica, Daimon, Límite, Theoria or Teorema. He is member of the research group Phrónesis: Analytic Philosophy Group.

Published

2013-02-18

Issue

Section

Articles