Constitutional Interpretation: between dynamic and integrity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2016v37n72p67Abstract
This article talks about the constitutional interpretation from the perspective of two normative theories of jurisdiction: on one hand, Ronald Dworkin’s law as integrity; on the other, William Eskridge’s dynamic statutory interpretation.The theories are presented as indications for the debate about who has the best conditionsto make decisions on hard cases. Therefore, the article points out some changes that occurred lately on the constitutional jurisdiction, presents key aspects of the theories in focus and outlines commonalities and differences between the dynamic statutory interpretation and the theory of law as integrity.Downloads
Published
2016-04-26
How to Cite
CLÈVE, Clèmerson Merlin; LORENZETTO, Bruno Meneses. Constitutional Interpretation: between dynamic and integrity. Seqüência - Legal and Political Studies, Florianópolis, v. 37, n. 72, p. 67–92, 2016. DOI: 10.5007/2177-7055.2016v37n72p67. Disponível em: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/2177-7055.2016v37n72p67. Acesso em: 30 jun. 2024.
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