Defensive democracy in Germany and Brazil in today’s practice: parallels between the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and the Brazilian Office for democracy defense
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2023.e95761Keywords:
Defensive Democracy, Democratic erosion, Brazilian Office for Democracy Defense, Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)Abstract
The subject “defensive democracy” came back in Brazil during the government of former President Jair Bolsonaro, since the other two Branches identified the need to fight the democratic erosion provoked by him. With the recent change of government, the Executive Branch, reportedly inspired by the alluded theory, created an office for the defense of democracy, under the supervision of the Attorney General, whose main goal is to protect the integrity of the public action and the preservation of the three Branches and their members, ensuring the exercise of their constitutional functions. The Brazilian Office for Democracy Defense follows the example set by Germany in the second post-war period, when this European country created, for the same reasons, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). Based on this background, the main goal of this paper is to present the two government initiatives mentioned above, in addition to tracing the possible parallels between Germany and Brazil in the creation of a culture of “defensive democracy” and, what is more relevant, in the effective defense of democracy.
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