Is there a normative basis for injustice?

Abstract

This article pretends to argue that there is a normative foundation in a project of Theory of Injustice. This will be justified because the normativity of injustice is drawn from a historical social experience of (i) domination, (ii) discrimination and (iii) second-order oppression whose social norms and practices are harmful, unequal, structural, institutional and systemic. To develop this justification, we divide the article into three parts. The first part consists of an introduction about the relationship between social philosophy and injustice. In the second part, we present the development of what constitutes the normative point of view of injustice: we will, therefore, present the methodological structure of a Theory of Injustice. Next, we will address its two central theoretical elements, namely, social experience and the historical thread. By exposing the methodological structure and these theoretical elements, we will, on the one hand, develop the theoretical framework that configures the normative foundation of injustice and, on the other, present a way of confronting its reality. Finally, the third moment will summarize, as a conclusion, the arguments presented previously.