Two views of anger

Abstract

This essay argues for the reading that anger is an affection whose transformative attribute lies in its potential to be an emancipatory (of revolt) in the face of injustice. To present this interpretation, I divide the argument into three parts. In the first part, I address the relationship between the propositional content of anger and the experience of injustice. From this relationship, I draw two conclusions. The first conclusion is that hermeneutics of anger, followed by its discharge into the world, acquires a conceptual semantics since its theoretical corpus is followed by an intersubjective order. The second conclusion affirms that the sociability of this affection behaves as a heuristic-motivational element that reacts to negative experiences caused by injustice. Following this, in the second part, I reconstruct its traditional perspective, that is, its conservative reading. I will thus present a philosophical reading of anger as a counterproductive social reaction that self-harms the political-moral legitimacy of those who act in its name. Thirdly, I argue that there is a critical perspective, that is, one that interprets this emotion as a sensitive-social force of emancipation. Anger, thus, is conceived as collective action guided by abolitionist ideals and practices: when used accurately and in the name of social change, it becomes a powerful source of social transformation.