Some conceptions of Law and their gaps

Abstract

The article begins with an analysis about the relations between cases and juridical norms on what may be called “classic model” by Alchurrón and Bulygin, corresponding to the work “Normative Systems”, by both authors. The author notes how how the thesis of this “classic model” prevent the perception on the mistakes between the jurists and how they strongly contrast with the shared beliefs between them; beliefs which, in the author’s opinion, are constitutive of the reality of Law. Analogue problems presents the construction of Joseph Raz, another great contemporary exponent of the so-called “Strong” or “excludent” positivism. Both constructions, by Anchurrón and Bulygin and by Raz, have in common, in the author’s opinion, and impoverished vision on the variety of regulative norms. On the second part, the author presents an alternative model of approaching the relations between cases and norms from a vision of the regulative dimension of Law which presents it as composed by two levels: the rules and the underlying principles. Finally, the author presents some coherent reconstructions to the previous model, in which refers to the concepts
of normative gap and axiological gap.