Constitutional symmetry: what federation are we building?

Abstract

More than three decades after the advent of the 1988 Constitution, the centralization of power and competences around the Union is still present in the Brazilian federal state, to the detriment of the political-administrative autonomy of the sub-national entities. Contributing to this centralization is the broad interpretation given by the Federal Supreme Court to the principle of constitutional symmetry. The problem posed by the research is precisely to verify which criteria are currently used by the Brazilian Constitutional Court regarding the application of constitutional symmetry and its effects on the political-administrative autonomy of federal entities. As a general objective, this article seeks to analyze the interpretation given by the Federal Supreme Court to the principle of constitutional symmetry. The specific objectives are to outline the appropriate legal conception of constitutional symmetry based on the structuring constitutional principles set out in the current Constitution, with the presentation of clearer and more concrete interpretative guidelines in relation to its conceptual extension and application by the Judiciary. To this end, the deductive research method will be adopted, starting from the general premises established in the constitutional text to form the critical thinking correlated to the proposed problem. In conclusion, constitutional symmetry is intended to safeguard the structuring constitutional principles when exercising the political-administrative autonomy of the entities of the Federation, without prejudice to preserving the minimum essential nuclei of self-determination of the States, Municipalities and the Federal District, without which an effectively decentralized and plural Federation will not be achieved.