Between reflexive cooperation and procedural democracy

Abstract

The philosophy of Axel Honneth on recognition analyzes the relationship between the theory of psychological development and the moral development of society in order to reach new parameters to renew Critical Theory. The key element of his theoretical framework is the concept of identity as an intersubjective struggle for mutual recognition. In turn, Jürgen Habermas has developed a procedural conception of law and democracy, whose theoretical inflows are critical to the political philosophy of recognition. In the works  Inclusion of the Other and  Law and Democracy, the author emphasizes that the rights system is responsive to demands for recognition of multicultural societies, so that cultural groups should articulate in decision-making processes those traditions they wish to perpetuate. That fact notwithstanding, for Honneth the institutionalization of procedures capable of laying the basis for the normative expectations of the demands of identity would be insufficient to ensure effective social justice and thus would fail to capture the moral status inherent in intersubjective struggles for recognition: the experience of disrespect. On the basis of the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey, Honneth outlines a theoretical tool capable of linking democracy, cooperative division of labor and freedom. Indeed, we intend to present a theoretical contrast between  the Habermasian procedural model and the reflective cooperation model developed by Axel Honneth, in order to deepen understanding of the political philosophy of recognition.