Rights and care for the protection of nonhuman animal’s practical autonomy

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present Steven Wise’s concept of practical autonomy and how it is distinguished from the traditional and modern Kantian notion of autonomy. This is justified in order to emphasize the importance of this concept of autonomy for the recognition of legal rights to nonhuman animals, and the protection of its particular way of life through care practices and responsibility in the relations between human and nonhuman animals. By the aid of bibliographical research and theoretical analysis, we foremost present Wise’s main conceptual distinctions and, secondly, indicate the application of the concept of practical autonomy in the legal context, aiming to recognize rights for animals. Finally, we show how the concept of practical autonomy requires more than legal rights. It also implies moral obligations by individual agents and by the State to ensure appropriate conditions for autonomy and freedom of nonhuman animals.